Sabotage in Berlin exposes vulnerability of critical connections

In early January, part of Berlin was left without power for several days due to a fire in a bridge containing power cables.¹ In the middle of winter, this meant tens of thousands of households and businesses had no electricity, no heating, and no internet.² It was not a technical failure, but deliberate arson at a cable bridge near the Lichterfelde power plant.³ Over 45,000 homes and around 2,200 businesses were left without power. It then took days before the power supply was restored via temporary cabling.

German police and city authorities assume sabotage. A left-wing extremist group calling itself the "Vulkangruppe" claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement.⁴ Police consider this claim credible, although investigation into the exact identity of those involved is still ongoing.

Outside Germany, the incident received relatively little attention. Yet the implications of the incident are significant because it shows how vital infrastructure can be disrupted relatively easily, with major consequences for society. These implications are also of great importance for the Netherlands.

The incident in Berlin fits into a broader pattern: infrastructure sabotage exists in a grey area between activism, extremism and hybrid threat. According to German security services, the Vulkangruppe has been active in Berlin and Brandenburg since 2011.⁵ Their targets: cable shafts, high-voltage lines, telecommunications connections and energy installations. Through these actions, the vulnerability of public systems becomes visible.

Remarkably, this type of attack does not require highly specialized knowledge. Experts point out that crucial nodes in energy infrastructure are often relatively easy to identify and that sabotage can be carried out with simple means, such as arson.⁶ The impact does not stem from technical complexity, but from hitting physical links that prove to be less robust in practice than assumed.

The relevance for the Netherlands does not lie in the expectation that exactly the same scenario could occur here. The relevance lies in the comparable underlying vulnerability. Here too, dependence on uninterrupted power supply is growing, driven by electrification, digitization and the concentration of functions in urban areas.

The incident in Berlin raises concrete questions for administrators and regulators. How vulnerable are our networks to such sabotage? How much outage is acceptable? How long may recovery take before social disruption occurs? And who bears responsibility if a failure is resolved not after a few hours but only after several days?

For energy companies and grid operators, outage minutes are not abstract KPIs but indicators of operational resilience, reputational risk and the delivery obligation they have. In Berlin, approximately 45,000 homes and around 2,200 businesses were without power and basic services for several days. For healthcare institutions, logistics companies, industry and urban services, this means direct supply chain effects and increased health and safety risks.

Organizations can already take concrete steps now to increase their preparedness for a 'Berlin scenario'. This begins with further determining their own grid-technical vulnerabilities, and a possible recalibration of acceptable recovery time per critical process, including scenarios for different weather conditions and peak load during a crisis.

Sabotage requires practicing scenarios in which electricity, heating and communication fail simultaneously for several days. In such situations, it must be determined in advance which connections receive recovery priority, which interests carry more weight and who decides on this. Without these agreements, delays in recovery and decision-making arise during a prolonged disruption.

The sabotage in Berlin shows that physical attacks on energy infrastructure are not theoretical risks, but a real stress test for governance and operations. But the implications reach further than the energy infrastructure itself. The core question for Dutch organizations that work with or on societally critical processes is uncomfortable but necessary: if a critical link fails for days, is it clear who decides, what gets priority and how recovery is organized without social disruption?

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¹ Tagesschau, 'Stromausfall in Teilen Berlins: Linksextreme Gruppe bekennt sich', January 5, 2026, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/regional/berlin/stromausfall-vulkangruppe-100.html

² Tagesschau, 'Nach Stromausfall: Beamtenbund sieht kritische Infrastruktur gefährdet', January 10, 2026, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/beamtenbund-blackout-100.html

³ Tagesschau, 'Stromausfall in Berlin: Was über die „Vulkangruppen" bekannt ist', January 5, 2026, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/vulkangruppe-anschlag-berlin-100.html

⁴ Tagesspiegel, 'Tatortfotos zeigen brennende Kabel: Vulkangruppe bekennt sich zu Anschlag', January 4, 2026, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/tatortfotos-zeigen-brennende-kabel-linksextreme-vulkangruppe-bekennt-sich-zu-anschlag-auf-stromversorgung-in-berlin-15100260.html

⁵ Rbb24, '"Vulkangruppe" weist Russland-Spekulationen zurück', January 7, 2026, https://www.rbb24.de/politik/beitrag/2026/01/vulkangruppe-berlin-stromausfall-gaskraftwerk-russland-bekennerschreiben.html

⁶ Rbb24, 'Experte: Täter brauchen für Anschläge auf Infrastruktur kein spezielles Wissen', October 9, 2025, https://www.rbb24.de/panorama/beitrag/2025/10/stromausfall-anschlag-berlin-treptow-koepenick-brandenburg-tesla.html

⁷ Rbb24, 'Vulkangruppe: Bekennerschreiben nach Stromausfall in Berlin', January 6, 2026, https://www.rbb24.de/politik/beitrag/2026/01/vulkangruppe-berlin-stromausfall-gaskraftwerk-russland-bekennerschreiben.html

⁸ Rbb24, 'Massiver Stromausfall im Süden Berlins nach Brand', January 3, 2026, https://www.rbb24.de/panorama/beitrag/2026/01/berlin-sueden-massiver-stromausfall-nikolassee-zehlendorf-wannsee-lichterfelde-verteilerstation-brand.html